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Reliable deployment of machine learning models such as neural networks contin-
ues to be challenging due to several limitations. Some of the main shortcomings
are the lack of interpretability and the lack of robustness against adversarial exam-
ples or out-of-distribution inputs. In this paper, we explore the possibilities and
limits of adversarial attacks for explainable machine learning models. First, we
extend the notion of adversarial examples to fit in explainable machine learning
scenarios, in which the inputs, the output classifications and the explanations of
the model’s decisions are assessed by humans. Next, we propose a comprehensive
framework to study whether (and how) adversarial examples can be generated for
explainable models under human assessment, introducing novel attack paradigms.
In particular, our framework considers a wide range of relevant (yet often ignored)
factors such as the type of problem, the user expertise or the objective of the ex-
planations in order to identify the attack strategies that should be adopted in each
scenario to successfully deceive the model (and the human). These contributions
intend to serve as a basis for a more rigorous and realistic study of adversarial
examples in the field of explainable machine learning.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks still face several weaknesses that hamper the development and deployment
of these technologies, despite their outstanding and ever-increasing capacity to solve complex artifi-
cial intelligence problems. One of the main shortcoming is their black-box nature, which prevents
analyzing and understanding their reasoning process, while such a requirement is increasingly de-
manded in order to guarantee a reliable and transparent use of artificial intelligence. To overcome
this limitation, different strategies have been proposed in the literature [1], ranging from post-hoc
explanation methods (which try to identify the parts, elements or concepts in the inputs that most
affect the decisions of trained models) [2, 3, 4, 5], to more proactive approaches which pursue a
transparent reasoning by training inherently interpretable models [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11].
Another issue that threatens the reliability of deep neural networks is their low robustness to adver-
sarial examples [12], which, indeed, can be seen as a direct implication of their lack of human-like
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reasoning. Therefore, improving the explainability of the models is as well a promising direction
to achieve adversarial robustness, hypothesis which is supported by recent works which show that
interpretability and robustness are connected [13, 14, 15, 16]. At the same time, the assumption of
explainable classification models introduces new questions regarding the definition of adversarial
examples: can adversarial examples be deployed if humans observe not only the input but also the
output classification or the corresponding explanation?
In this paper, we shed light on this question by incrementally extending the notion of adversarial
examples for explainable machine learning scenarios, in which humans can not only assess the
input sample, but also compare it to the output of the model. These extended notions of adversarial
examples allow us to exhaustively analyze the possible attacks that can be produced by means of
adversarially changing the model’s classification and explanations, either jointly or independently
(that is, changing the explanation without altering the output class, or vice versa). Our analysis
leads to a comprehensive framework that establishes whether (and how) adversarial attacks can be
generated for explainable models under human supervision. Moreover, we thoroughly describe the
requirements that adversarial examples should satisfy in order to be able to mislead an explainable
model (and even a human) depending on multiple scenarios or factors which, despite their relevance,
are often overlooked in the literature of adversarial examples for explainable models, such as the
expertise of the user or the objective of the explanation. All these contributions are intended to
establish a basis for a more rigorous study of the vulnerabilities of explainable machine learning in
adversarial scenarios.
2 Related work
2.1 Overview of explanation methods
In this section, we summarize the explanation methods proposed in the literature, in order to present
the terminology and taxonomy that will be used in the subsequent sections to develop our analytical
framework on adversarial examples in explainable models.
2.1.1 Scope, objective and impact of the explanations
The objective of an explanation is to justify the behavior of a model in a way that is easily under-
standable to humans. However, different users might be interested in different aspects of the model,
and, therefore, the explanations can be generated for different scopes or objectives.
Overall, the scope of an explanation can be categorized as local or global [1]. On the one hand, local
methods aim to characterize or explain the model’s prediction for each particular input individually,
for example, by identifying the most relevant parts or features of each input. On the other hand,
global methods attempt to expose the general reasoning process of the model, for instance, summa-
rizing (e.g., using a more simple but interpretable model) when a certain class will be predicted, or
describing to what extent a particular input-feature is related to one class. Since in this paper we will
address the vulnerability of explainable models to adversarial examples, we we will focus on local
methods.
In addition, explanations can be used, even for the same model, for different functional purposes.
For instance, users querying the model for a credit loan might be interested in explaining the output
obtained for their particular cases only, whereas a developer might be interested in discovering why
that model misclassifies certain input samples. At the same time, an analyst can be interested in
whether that model is biased against a social group for unethical reasons. At a higher level, all these
purposes are based on necessities involving ethics, safety or knowledge acquisition, among others
[17]. Based on the functional purpose of the explanations and the particular problem, domain or
scenario in which they are required, another relevant factor should be taken into consideration: the
impact of the explanations, which can be defined as the consequence of the decisions made based on
the analysis of the explanation. Healthcare domains are clear examples in which the consequences
of the decisions can be severe.
Despite the relevance of these factors, they are often overlooked when local explanation methods
are designed or evaluated [17, 18]. The same happens for adversarial attacks in explainable models.
We argue that the context, the functional purpose and the impact of explanations should be key fac-
tors when designing adversarial attacks against explainable models, since a different attack strategy
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needs to be adopted in each context to successfully deceive the model (and the human). This will be
discussed in detail in Section 3.
2.1.2 Types of explanations
Different types of explanations exist depending on how the explanation is conveyed:
Feature-based explanations: assign an importance score to each feature in the input, based on
their relevance for the output classification. Common feature-based explanations (specially in the
image domain) are activation or saliency maps, which highlight the most relevant parts of the input.
Other approaches are based on perturbation-based methods, which alter an input (for instance, by
removing or masking some regions) to assess which parts are the most relevant ones for the predic-
tion. Although feature-based explanations such as saliency maps are the most employed ones in the
literature (particularly in the image domain), previous works have identified that such explanations
can be unreliable and misleading [4, 8, 19, 20, 21, 22].
Example-based explanations: the explanation is based on comparing the similarity between the
input at hand and a set of prototypical inputs that are representative of the predicted class. Thus, the
classification of a given input sample is justified by the similarity between it and the prototypes of the
predicted class. We will refer to these types of explanations as prototype-based explanations in the
paper, although different forms of example-based explanation exist, such as the strategy proposed
in [23], where influence functions are employed to estimate the training images most responsible
for a prediction. Recent works have integrated prototype-based explanations directly in the learning
process of neural networks, so that the classification is based on the similarities between the input
and a set of prototypes [6, 7, 8, 9], achieving a more interpretable reasoning. The prototypes can
represent an entire input describing one class (e.g., a prototypical handwritten digit "1" in digit
classification) [6], or represent image-parts or semantic concepts [7, 9, 8].
Rule-based explanations: these explanation methods aim to expose the reasoning of a model in
a simplified or human-understandable set of rules, such as logic-rules or if-then-else rules, which
represent a natural form of explanations for humans. Rule-based explanations are particularly
well-suited when the input contains features which are easily interpretable. In this paper, special
attention will be given to counterfactual explanations [24]. Although counterfactual explanations
can be considered, in their form, as rule-based explanation, we will consider them separately in
some cases due to their conditional or hypothetical reasoning nature, as the aim is suggesting the
possible changes that should happen in the input to receive a different (and frequently more positive)
output classification (e.g., “a rejected loan request would be accepted if the subject would have a
higher income”).
Overall, the most suitable type of explanation depends on the domain, the scope and the purpose
of the explanation, as well as on the expertise level of the users querying the model. We refer the
reader to [1, 17, 25] for a more fine-grained overview of explanation methods.
2.2 Reliability of explanations under adversarial attacks
Some explanation methods in the literature have been proven to be unreliable in adversarial settings.
In [26, 27, 28, 29, 30], it is shown that small changes in input samples can produce drastic changes in
feature-importance explanations, while maintaining the output classification. In [26], the proposed
attacks are also evaluated in the example-based explanations proposed in [23], based on estimating
the relevance of each training image for a given prediction by using influence-functions. In [31],
adversarial attacks capable of changing the explanations while maintaining the outputs are created
for self-explainable (prototype-based) classifiers. In [29, 30], it is shown that adversarial examples
can also produce wrong outputs and (feature-importance) explanations at the same time, or change
the output while maintaining the explanations [29].
The authors of [32] show that trustworthy explanations can be produced for a biased or an untrust-
worthy model, thus manipulating user trust. This approach is, however, not based on adversarial
attacks, as they focus on producing a global explanation model that closely approximates the origi-
nal (black-box) model but which employs trustworthy features instead of sensitive or discriminatory
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features (which are actually being used by the original model to predict). Similarly, in [33, 34] ad-
versarial models are generated, capable of producing incorrect or misleading explanations whithout
harming their predictive performance. In [33], a fine-tuning procedure is proposed to adversarially
manipulate models, so that saliency map based explanations drastically change (becoming ineffec-
tive in highlighting the relevant regions) whereas the accuracy of the model is maintained.
Some works have also tried to justify the vulnerability of explanation methods to adversarial attacks,
or the links between them. In [26, 27], the non-smooth geometry of decision boundaries (of complex
models) is blamed, arguing that, due to these properties, small changes in the inputs implies that the
direction of the gradients (i.e., normal to the decision boundary) can drastically change. As most
explanation methods rely on gradient information, the change in the gradient direction implies a
different explanation. In [29, 30], the vulnerability is attributed to a gap between predictions and
explanations. It is an open question whether this hypothesis holds for self-explainable models, which
have been trained jointly to classify accurately and to provide explanations. Finally, theoretical
connections between explanations and adversarial examples are established in [13, 35].
2.3 Further connections between adversarial examples and interpretability
Paradoxically, using explanations to support or justify the prediction of a model can imply security
breaches, as they might reveal sensitive information [36]. For instance, an adversary can use ex-
planations of how a black-box model works (e.g., what features are most relevant in a prediction)
in order to design more effective attacks. Similarly, in this paper we will show that justifying the
classification of the model with an explanation makes it possible to generate types of deception us-
ing adversarial examples that, without explanations, it would not be possible to generate (e.g., to
convince an expert that a misclassification of the model is correct).
On another note, recent works have shown that robust (e.g., adversarially trained) models are more
interpretable [13, 14, 15, 16]. In [13], this is justified by showing that the farther the inputs are with
respect to the decision boundaries, the more aligned are the inputs with their saliency maps, thus,
being more interpretable.
Finally, the commonalities between interpretation methods and adversarial attacks and defenses are
analyzed in [37], showing how adversarial methods can be reinterpreted from an interpretation per-
spective, and discussing how techniques from one field can bring advances into the other. Our paper,
however, addresses a different objective. In contrast to [37], which focuses on highlighting the simi-
larities between particular methods from both (explainable and adversarial machine learning) fields,
in this paper we propose a comprehensive framework to study if (and how) adversarial examples can
be generated for explainable models under human assessment.
3 Extending adversarial examples for explainable machine learning
scenarios
In this section, we extend the notion of adversarial examples to fit in explainable machine learning
contexts. For this purpose, we start from a basic definition of adversarial examples, and incremen-
tally discuss more comprehensive scenarios in which the human subjects judge not only the input
sample, but also the model’s decisions, including the output classification and the corresponding
explanations. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has addressed comprehensively this type
of generalization of adversarial examples.
This extended definition allows us to provide a general framework that identifies the way in which
an adversary should design an adversarial example to deploy effective attacks even when a human
is assessing the prediction process. The introduced framework also identifies the most effective
ways of deploying attacks depending on factors such as the type of problem or the way in which the
explanation is conveyed. From an adversary perspective, this framework provides a comprehensive
road map for the design of malicious attacks in realistic scenarios involving explainable models and
a human assessment of the predictions. From a developer or a defender perspective, this road map
helps to identify the most critical requirements that their explainable model should satisfy to be
reliable.
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3.1 Scenarios in which human subjects are aware of the model predictions
Regular adversarial attacks are based on the assumption that an adversary can introduce a perturba-
tion into an input sample, so that:
1. The perturbation is not noticeable to humans, and, therefore, the ground-truth class of the
perturbed input does not change.
2. The class predicted by a machine learning model changes.
Note that, according to this general definition of adversarial examples, the human criterion is only
considered regarding the input sample, without any human assessment of the model’s output. Main-
taining this assumption, then the same definition of adversarial examples can be applied in the con-
text of explainable machine learning. However, this assumption is not realistic, as the point of
explainable models is to assess not only their classification but also their reasoning. For these rea-
sons, the following question arises: are regular adversarial examples useful in practice when the
user is aware of the output?
To address this question, we start by discussing four different scenarios, based on the agreement of
the following factors: f(x), the model’s prediction of the input; h(x), the classification performed
by a human subject; and yx, the ground-truth class of an input x (which will be unknown for both
the model and the human subject in the prediction phase of the model). For clarification, we assume
that a human misclassification (h(x) 6= yx) can occur in scenarios in which the addressed task is
of high complexity (e.g., medical diagnosis) or the label of an input is ambiguous (e.g., sentiment
analysis). Although a human misclassification might be uncommon in simple problems such as
object recognition, even in such cases ambiguous or challenging inputs can be found. Finally, unless
specified, we will assume expert subjects, that is, subjects with knowledge in the task and capable
of providing well-founded classifications.1
According this framework, the four possible scenarios are as follows:
1. Both the model and the human subject agree with the ground-truth class of the input, that
is: f(x) = h(x) = yx.
2. The model has misclassified the input whereas it is well classified by the human subject:
f(x) 6= h(x) = yx. This is, indeed, the case produced when an adversarial example is
classified, as will be described below.
3. The human observer (incorrectly) disagrees with the model’s prediction, which is correct:
h(x) 6= f(x) = yx.
4. Both the model and the human subject wrongly classify the input: f(x) 6= yx ∧ h(x) 6= yx
If h(x) = f(x), the model’s prediction will be (wrongly) considered as correct according
to the human criterion. Otherwise, the model’s output will be considered incorrect, but for
wrong reasons.
According to the described casuistry, adversarial attacks aim to produce the second scenario (i.e.,
f(x) 6= h(x) = yx), by imperceptibly perturbing an input x0 that satisfies f(x0) = h(x0) = yx0
(i.e., the first scenario) so that the model’s output is changed, but without altering the human percep-
tion of the input (what, therefore, implies h(x) = yx = yx0). However, assuming that the user is
aware of the output, the fulfillment of the attack is subject to whether human subjects can correct the
detected misclassification, or have control over the implications of that prediction. For example, an
adversarial traffic signal will only produce a dramatic consequence in autonomous cars if the drivers
do not take the control with sufficient promptness.
Regarding the remaining cases, they do not fit in the definition of an adversarial attack since ei-
ther the input is misclassified by the human subject (h(x) 6= yx) or the model is not fooled
(f(x) = h(x) = yx). Nevertheless, assuming a more general definition, scenarios involving human
misclassifications could be potentially interesting for an adversary. Similarly to regular adversar-
ial attacks, which force the second scenario departing from the first one, an adversary might be
1Different degrees of expertise can be considered for a more comprehensive scenario, such as unskilled
subjects, or partially skilled subjects capable of providing basic judgments about the input (for instance, a
subject might not be able to visually discriminate different species of reptiles, yet be able to visually classify
an animal as a reptile and not as another animal class).
5
interested in forcing the fourth scenario departing from the third one. Let us take as an example a
complex computer-aided diagnosis task through medical images, in which an expert subject fails in
its diagnosis while the model is correct. In such cases, we can induce a human error confirmation
attack by forcing the model to confirm the (wrong) medical diagnosis produced by the expert, that
is, forcing f(x) = h(x) 6= yx.
Based on the above discussion, we can determine that some types of adversarial attacks can still be
effective even when the user is aware of the output. Nonetheless, paradoxically, it is possible to in-
troduce new types of adversarial attacks when the output classification is supported by explanations,
as we show in the following section.
3.2 Scenarios in which human subjects are aware of the explanations
The scenarios described in the previous section can be further extended for the case of explainable
machine learning models, as the explanations for the predictions come into play. As a consequence,
each of the cases defined above can be subdivided into new subcases depending on whether the
explanations match the output class or whether humans agree with the model’s explanations. To
avoid an exhaustive enumeration of all the possible scenarios, we focus only on the ones that we
identify as interesting from an adversary perspective. From this standpoint, given an explainable
model, adversarial examples can be generated by perturbing a well classified input (for which the
corresponding explanation is also correct and coherent) with the aim of changing the output class,
the provided explanation or both at the same time.
To formalize these scenarios, let us denote Af (x) the explanation provided to characterize the de-
cision f(x) of a machine learning model, and Ah(x) the explanation provided by a human-subject
according to its knowledge or criteria. The agreement of a human subject with the explanation
provided by the model will be denoted as Af (x) ≈ Ah(x) (that is, the model’s explanation is co-
herent for a human), whereas the disagreement will be denoted as Af (x) 6= Ah(x). Similarly, we
will denote A(x) ∼ yx if an explanation A(x) is consistent with the reasons that characterize the
ground-truth class of the input (that is, if the explanation correctly characterizes or supports the clas-
sification). For simplification, unless specified, we assume that h(x) = yx and that Ah(x) ∼ yx, this
is, the human classification of an input into one class is correct and is based on reasons consistent
for that class.
The identified scenarios are as follows:
A.1 f(x) = yx ∧ Af (x) 6= Ah(x). In this case, the model is right but the explanations
are incorrect or differ from the ones that would be provided by a human. Adversarial
attacks capable of producing such scenarios have been studied in recent works for post-hoc
feature-importance explanations [26, 27, 28, 29, 30] and for self-explainable prototype-
base classifiers [31], showing that small perturbations can produce a drastic change in the
explanations without changing the output.
A.1.1 More particularly, we can imagine a scenario in which Af (x) ∼ yx despite
Af (x) 6= Ah(x), for instance, if the explanations point out to relevant and coherent
properties to classify the input as yx (at least partially), but which do not compose
the most relevant or correct explanation (with respect to the given input) according to
a human criterion. From an adversary’s perspective, changing the explanations with-
out forcing a wrong classification allows to introduce confusing recommendations.
For illustration, a model can (correctly) reject a loan request but accompanied with a
wrong explanation, preventing the applicant from correcting the actually relevant defi-
ciencies of the request. Similarly, a wrong explanation of a medical diagnosis system
might lead to a wrong treatment or prescription. In addition, biased or discrimina-
tive explanations could be produced with this attack scheme, for instance, attributing
a loan rejection to sensitive features (e.g., racial or religious). Such an explanation
could make the models look unreliable or untrustworthy for users. Oppositely,
biases could be hided by producing trustworthy explanations to manipulate user
trust [32].
A.2 f(x) 6= yx ∧ Af (x) 6= Ah(x). In this case both the classification and the explanation pro-
vided by the model are incorrect. Adversarial attacks capable of producing such scenarios
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have been investigated in recent works [29, 30]. More particularly, we identify two specific
sub-cases as relevant when a human assesses the entire classification process:
A.2.1 Af (x) ∼ f(x). In this case, the fact that the provided explanation is coherent with the
(incorrectly) predicted class can increase the confidence of the human in the prediction,
being therefore interesting from an adversary perspective. We identify this case as the
most direct extension of adversarial examples for explainable models, as the model is
not only fooled but also supports its own misclassification with the explanation.
A.2.2 Af (x) 6∼ f(x). This case is similar to the previous one (A.2.1), with the important
difference that the model’s explanation is now coherent with a class y′ different to
f(x) and yx (assuming that Ah(x) ∼ yx, then Af (x) 6= Ah(x) ⇒ Af (x) 6∼ yx).
Thus, we are in a scenario in which a total mismatch is produced between all the
considered factors. Whereas these attacks are an interesting case of study, they are
also the most challenging to be deployed in practice without the inconsistencies being
noticed.
A.3 f(x) 6= yx ∧ Af (x) ≈ Ah(x) ∧ Af (x) ∼ yx. In this case, the model’s classification is
wrong but the provided explanations are coherent from a human perspective with respect to
the ground-truth class yx. The agreement in the explanations can increase the confidence in
the model, but, at the same time, the output is not consistent with the explanation. However,
the consistency issue might be solved by finding an input for which the explanation not
only satisfies Af (x) ∼ yx but also Af (x) ∼ f(x), for instance, by finding an ambiguous
explanation that is applicable to both classes.
3.3 Possible attack strategies based on the explanation method employed
Whereas our framework considers models’ explanations in their most general form, the way in which
an explanation is conveyed determines how humans process and interpret the information. This
implies that some attack strategies might be more suitable for some type of explanations than for
others. Moreover, the way in which an adversarial example is generated for an explainable machine
learning model will also depend on the type of explanation. For these reasons, in this section we
briefly discuss in which way an adversarial example should be designed depending on the type of
explanation or the particular type of attack to be produced.
• Feature-based explanations: the highlighted parts or features need to be coherent with
the classification, and correspond to (I) human-perceivable, (II) semantically meaningful
and (III) relevant parts. A common criticism to feature-based explanations such as saliency
maps is that they identify the relevant parts of the inputs, but no how the models are pro-
cessing such parts [20]. Thus, an adversarial attack could take advantage of this limitation.
First, a particular region of the input can be highlighted to support a misclassification of the
model and to convince the user (assuming that such region contributes to predict an incor-
rect class), which is interesting particularly for targeted adversarial attacks (that is, when
the objective of the attack is to produce a specific incorrect output). An attack could also
highlight irrelevant parts to mislead the observer, or generate ambiguous explanations by
highlighting multiple regions or providing a uniform map, which are strategies well-suited
for untargeted attacks (that is, when the aim is to change the output of the model, without
any preference in the incorrect class).
• Prototype-based explanations: in this case, for the human to accept the given explanation,
the key features of the closest prototypes should (I) be perceptually identifiable in the given
input, and, ideally, (II) contain features correlated with the output class. The contrary
should happen for the farther prototypes, that is, their key features should not be present
in the input nor be correlated with the output class (or, ideally, be opposite). In order to
achieve these objectives, the more general the prototypes (e.g., if they represent semantic
concepts or parts of inputs rather than completely describing an output class), the higher
the chances of producing explanations that could lead to a wrong classification while being
coherent with a human perception, such as ambiguous explanations.
• Rule-based explanations can be fooled by targeting explanations which are aligned with
the model output (e.g., the explanation justifies the prediction or at least mimics the model
behavior), but which employ reliable, trustworthy or neutral features [34]. For instance,
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a model for criminal-recidivism prediction could provide a negative assessment based on
unethical reasons whereas the explanation is taken as ethical.
• Counterfactual explanations: in this case, the objective of an adversarial attack could
be forcing a particular counterfactual explanation, suggesting changes on irrelevant fea-
tures (thus preventing correcting the actually relevant deficiencies), or forcing a biased or
discriminatory explanations in detriment of the model’s fairness.
3.4 Desiderata for adversarial attacks in different scenarios involving explainable machine
learning models
In Table 1, we describe the main characteristics or desiderata that an adversarial attack should satisfy
in different scenarios in order to be successful. We build on the idea that common tasks, problems or
applications have common categories, and that explanations or interpretation needs are different in
each of them [17]. Thus, adversarial attacks (or, oppositely, the defensive countermeasures) should
also be designed differently for each type of explanation, focusing on the more relevant or crucial
factor in each case. The scenarios described in Table 1 comprise different degrees of expertise
of the human in supervision of the classification process and different functional purposes of the
explanation. It is important to note that a particular problem or task could belong to more than
one scenario (i.e., scenarios are not mutually-exclusive). Moreover, we emphasize that some of the
scenarios involve factors which are difficult to quantify in a formal way (e.g., the expertise of a user).
Nevertheless, we believe that it is necessary to consider such detailed scenarios in order to rigorously
discuss which type of adversarial examples can be realizable in practice.
The first scenario described in Table 1 (S1) comprises tasks in which the implications of the decisions
made by the model cannot be controlled by the user, or cases in which there is no time for a human
supervision of the predictions. Despite the relevance of some tasks that fall into this category (e.g.,
autonomous cars or massive content filtering), humans cannot thoroughly evaluate each possible
prediction. For this reason, explanations are not of practical use in such cases, so the main (or only)
goal of an adversary is to produce an incorrect output.
Nevertheless, interpretability or explainability can be desirable properties for any model (including
those developed for the scenario S1) in order to debug or validate them (S2 scenario). For instance,
a model developer might want to explain the decisions of a self-driving car (even if the end-user
will not receive explanations when the model is put into practice) to assess why it has provided
an incorrect output, to validate its reasoning process or to gain knowledge about what the model
has learned. In such cases, an adversary could justify a misclassification of the model (A.2.1, A.3),
hide an inappropriate behavior when the model predicts correct but for the wrong reasons (A.1.1),
or produce wrong outputs and explanations at the same time (A.2). The same attack strategies are
applicable in scenarios in which the models’ decisions are taken as more relevant or imperative than
the experts’ judgment (S3). The main difference with respect to the scenario S1 is that, in this case,
explanations can be useful or relevant even when the model is deployed or employed by the end-user,
and, therefore, the attack should also take the explanations into consideration instead of considering
only the output class.
In addition, we consider four different scenarios depending on the expertise level of the user query-
ing the model, which range from no expertise (S4), medium expertise (S5) and high expertise (S6).
The case of no expertise (S4) is the simplest one from the perspective of the adversary, as any attack
scheme can be produced without arousing suspicions, taking advantage of the user inexperience. For
the same reason, models deployed in such scenarios should also be the ones with more security mea-
sures against adversarial attacks. If the user’s expertise is medium (S5), the explanation is expected
to clarify the classification to the user. Thus, the explanation should be sufficiently consistent with
the main semantic features in the input (e.g., the user might not be able to diagnose a medical image,
but can identify the relevant spots depending on what is being diagnosed, such as darker spots in
skin-cancer diagnosis), and/or sufficiently consistent with the output class (A.1.1, A.2.1, A.3). Sim-
ilarly, if the user has a partial expertise (S7), which could happen in hierarchical classification tasks,
then the adversary needs to ensure that the output and the explanations are coherent only with the
factors or features that are familiar for the user.
A user with high expertise (S6), by definition, will realize that a model is producing a wrong output
or explanation. Therefore, the only way to mislead the model and convince the human of a wrong
prediction is by means of ambiguity (A.1.1, A.3). For instance, in an image classification task, two
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objects can appear at the same time, being possible to produce a wrong class with a reasonable ex-
planation (e.g., highlighting the secondary object as the most relevant one). In addition, in problems
in which the inputs are inherently ambiguous, such as natural language processing tasks, different
but reasonable explanations can be produced for the same input.
Finally, in some cases the explanations might be more interesting, necessary or challenging than
the output itself (S8). Some representative tasks are predictive maintenance (e.g., it might be more
interesting knowing why certain system will fail than just knowing that it will fail) or medical diag-
nosis (e.g., discovering why a model has diagnosed a patient as being at high risk for a particular
disease might be the main priority to prevent the disease or provide a better treatment). For these
reasons, a change in the explanation is critical for such models, being particularly sensitive to the
attacks described in A.1 (or those described in A.2.1, if the misclassification of the model is difficult
to notice by the user).
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced a comprehensive framework to rigorously study the possibilities
and limitations of adversarial examples in explainable machine learning scenarios, in which the in-
put, the model’s predictions and the explanations are assessed by humans. First, we have extended
the notion of adversarial examples in order to fit in such scenarios, which have allowed us to ex-
amine different adversarial attack paradigms. Furthermore, we thoroughly analyze how adversarial
attacks should be designed in order to mislead explainable machine learning models (and humans)
depending on a wide range of factors such as the type of task addressed, the expertise of the users
querying the model, as well as the type, scope or impact of the explanation methods used to justify
the decisions of the models. Overall, the proposed framework provides a comprehensive road map
for the design of malicious attacks in realistic scenarios involving explainable models and a human
supervision, contributing to a more rigorous study of adversarial examples in the field of explainable
machine learning.
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